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Abstract:
This paper looks at the impact of institutions on economic growth in the six largest countries in
BRIC countries, Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The study will us OLS to examine the time
period between the years 2002 and 2011. More specifically, it will measure the effect of
institutions through a variety of measures including democracy and regulatory related variables.
Through ordinary least squares regression analysis, the variables for democracy and regulation
will be significant and have a positive effect on economic growth. This study will show that
quality of institution does in fact support economic growth.
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1.0 Introduction
Throughout the world there has been wide debate on why some countries are more economically
developed than others and why do some grow faster than others. One explanation to these
questions is the institutions within such countries. This explanation is compared to previous
views that have used technological progress as the foremost explanation to economic growth and
development. New focus has been brought on the impact of institutions on economic growth and
rightfully so.
Institutions refers to the basic rules and structures that guide a society. For example, the
political and legal frameworks in a country are elements that effect economic development.
Boettke and Fink (2011) explain that institutions provide an environment of incentives and
impact the flow of information. The way institutions operate within a country has strong
influence on the economic activity and efficiency in that country. Issues like corruption can
cause an economy to run inefficiently while factors such as rule of law and government
effectiveness seem to be significant in economic progression. To more specifically measure the
effect of institutions different variables measuring democracy, rule of law, government
effectiveness, and regulation will be used.
This paper will use OLS to analyze the rapidly growing BRIC countries for the years
2002-2011. The four countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China will provide a large sample for
analysis on institutional effects. In the sample time period, these countries have sustained rapid

economic growth through in their own way. The variables used to measure institutions will
assist in differentiating what has actually helped spur economic growth.
2.0 Trends
Figure 1 shows the four selected countries’ GDP for the time period 2002-2011 in U.S. dollars.
It is evident that the Chinese economy is by far the largest compared to its counter parts. In
terms of GDP China was approximately double the size of its competitors and grew to nearly 3
times the size of the next closest nation, Brazil. It is also apparent of the effect of the 2008
financial crisis on these countries’ economies as it took its toll on the entire world.
Figure 1: GDP 2002-2011

Source: the World Bank

Figure 2 displays GDP per capita growth rates (in percentages) for the four selected countries. It
can be seen that China sustained significant growth rates throughout the period analyzed. All
countries show comparable declines in growth rate around the time of the 2008 crisis. It is also
evident that Russia suffered the worst from the crisis.
Figure 2: GDP Per Capita Growth Rate 2002-2011

Source: the World Bank

3.0 Literature Review
In the past, numerous papers have analyzed the effect of institutions on economic growth while
using data across a large number of countries. In comparison, this paper will only use OLS for
the years 2002-2011 to measure the effect of institutions in the BRIC nations. These other
papers have also used several other variables in addition to institution related variables to attempt
to gather some insight into the effects they have on economic growth.
Rodrik et al. (2002) examined the effects of institutions, integration of trade, and
geography on economic growth. The variables used to measure these factors included openness
of trade, rule of law, and distance from the equator to measure geography. This study used OLS
regression to determine the extent of each variable’s influence on economic growth. It was
found by Rodrik et al. (2002) that institutions did have a major effect on economic growth
compared to the policies made by such institutions. Consistent with the view of Rodrik et al.
(2002), Acemoglu et al. (2005) also argue that institutions are significant not because of their
policies, but by the way they influence technology and flow of capital. Acemoglu et al. (2005)
used variables such as economic institutions and political institutions to differentiate between the
effects of the actual institution and the policies they make. This discovery into the relationship
between institutions and policy is parallel to the conclusion made by Boettke and Fink (2011).
Boettke and Fink (2011) argue that institutions do in fact have a more significant impact
on economic growth than the policies that are put in place by these institutions. Under this

assumption they claim the most important aspect of institutions is secure private property rights.
According to Boettke and Fink (2011) a society with secure private property rights will run
efficiently in the long-term because of the confidence citizens have in the free-market rules and
laws put in place by institutions. Under this type of institution a citizen has the incentive and
confidence to engage in productive economic activities. Because of the importance placed upon
private property rights, this paper will be using a rule of law variable and several other regulatory
variables in addition to the model adopted from Jalles (2010) for the analysis on economic
growth in BRIC nations.
Jalles (2010) studies the effect of the political institution of democracy on economic
growth. In addition to democracy, Jalles (2010) also measures the effects of education using
education levels of various age groups. After analyzing the effects of various democracy and
human capital related variables through regression, Jalles (2010) found that both were significant
factors on economic growth. This study will be utilizing an adaptation of this model because it
essentially quantifies the impact of institutions on economic growth through several conduits.
As previously noted, several variables measuring regulatory quality will be added to Jalles’
(2010) model as it will provide the analysis with a more in depth measurement on the quality of
institutions.
In an analysis conducted by Decker and Lim (2007) democracy by itself was found to not
be a significant factor. The variables used were similar to Jalles (2010) and Rodrik et al. (2002)
where they used variables to measure the effects of institution, integration of trade, geography,
and democracy. Decker and Lim (2007) found that the institution of democracy needs to be
combined with openness of trade and free flowing markets to have a significant influence on

economic development. An example of this finding is illustrated by China who has had robust
economic growth under an autocratic political system because of proper. This leads us back to
findings by previous papers that have claimed policy and regulation to be the primary factors for
economic growth.
Barro (1996) discovered similar results to Decker and Lim (2007) regarding democracy.
By using similar variables such as democracy levels, education, rule of law and trade related
variables, Barro (1996) revealed at certain levels of democracy there are diminishing marginal
returns. This means that past a certain point of democracy it becomes counter-productive or less
efficient to be more democratic. For example, in a complete dictatorship it would be beneficial
for the economy to become more democratic because of the efficiencies involved with a free
market and open trade. However, there would be contrasting effects when an already democratic
state were to become more democratic because of the inefficiencies involved with increased
regulation.
4.0 Data and Empirical Methodology
4.1 Data
This study used OLS for the four countries for the time period 2002-2011. The four countries
are Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The data used for analysis came from an assortment of
databases. The dependent variable in this study, PCGR (per capita GDP growth rate), comes
from the World Bank database and will provide a way to measure economic growth. Also from
the World Bank are independent variables GDP (GDP at purchaser’s prices), INFL (inflation),
and AGEDEP (age dependency ratio). The independent variables IMPORT, EXPORT,

HUMCAP (human capital index), and GCF (gross capital formation) are derived from the Penn
World Tables 8.0. The variables listed above will provide the study with a base for the economic
growth model that will be used to further identify the effects of institutions.
The first measure of institutions is the POLITY variable, which is the independent
variable that measures democracy levels and will provide the study with a tool to properly
analyze the institution of democracy. The data for this variable comes from the Polity IV Project
which conducts analysis on governments worldwide and delivers what is known as the Polity
score. Other independent variables to be used for institutional analysis are VOACC (voice and
accountability), POLSTAB (political stability), GOVEFF (government effectiveness),
REGQUAL (regulatory quality), ROL (rule of law), and CORR (control of corruption). These
variables come from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database and will provide an in depth
examination of institutional quality. The complete list of variable names, definition, source, and
expected sign can be found in Appendix A. Also, the summary statistics for all variables are
shown below. It is interesting to note that many of the variables relating to individual freedoms
are negative due to the structure of the chose countries.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

PCGR

60

.0344322

.0471365

-.1174

.1619617

GDP

60

477559.6

477751.1

122585.1

1810141

GOVTEXP

60

6.40e+10

1.08e+11

5.75e+09

5.12e+11

INFL

60

.1101965

.0989885

.0047221

.4594327

AGEDEP

60

.5415217

.0431697

.4528466

.6209541

HUMCAP

60

2.556268

.2512948

2.103224

2.967541

GCF

60

.2206895

.0370633

.1230955

.3087595

POLITY

60

7.433333

2.714473

-3

10

VOACC

60

.1494249

.578003

-.960371

1.244145

POLSTAB

60

-.6274356

.8648242

-2.39011

1.00049

GOVEFF

60

-.0901574

.6818042

-1.189068

1.261179

REGQUAL

60

.0005065

.8720871

-1.608095

1.53563

ROL

60

-.3905

.8405877

-1.668911

1.358071

CORR

60

-.0988315

.7584468

-1.207238

1.553228

4.2 Methodology
This study utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to measure the impact of institutions
on economic growth. Seven similar regression models will be used in this analysis. All seven
models will have the same dependent variable (PCGR) and baseline independent variables for
economic growth (GDP, GCF, EXPORT, IMPORT, INFL, AGEDEP, and HUMCAP). Seven
models will be used because of multicollinearity between the institutional related independent

variables (POLITY, VOACC, POLSTAB, GOVEFF, REGQUAL, ROL, and CORR). The
models will take the following forms:
I) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL + β6AGEDEP
+ β7HUMCAP + β8POLITY + ε
II) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL + β6AGEDEP
+ β7HUMCAP + β8VOACC + ε
III) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL + β6AGEDEP
+ β7HUMCAP + β8POLSTAB + ε
IV) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL + β6AGEDEP
+ β7HUMCAP + β8GOVEFF + ε
V) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL + β6AGEDEP
+ β7HUMCAP + β8REGQUAL + ε
VI) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL + β6AGEDEP
+ β7HUMCAP + β8ROL + ε
VII) PCGR = β0 + β1GDP + β2GCF + β3 EXPORT + β4IMPORT + β5INFL +
β6AGEDEP + β7HUMCAP + β8CORR + ε
5.0 Empirical Results
As previously mentioned, this paper used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze the
effects of institutions on economic growth in Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Seven regressions

were conducted because of the multicollinearity between the institutional related variables that
were used. The results of the regressions are shown below in Table 2. The models analyzed
were relatively accurate with R-squared ranging from .7331 to .7551 with 40 observations in
each regression. The significance and effects of the independent variables related to institutions
are counterintuitive and go against what previous research has found.
The independent variables used in each model are GDP, GCF, EXPORT, IMPORT, INFL,
AGEDEP, and HUMCAP. These were the base variables used as predictors for the dependent
variable PCGR. Of these, GDP and GCF were statistically significant at the 1% level in all
seven regressions. The coefficients for GDP and GCF agree with common knowledge. As GDP
increases for a nation, growth rates will begin to slow. This is simply because of the
Convergence Hypothesis which simply means a country with higher GDP will grow slower than
a country with less GDP. Increased GCF will cause PCGR to also increase due to increased
investment on fixed assets. The variable EXPORT was statistically significant in four out of the
seven regressions. EXPORTS’ coefficient is in accordance with common knowledge as
increased exports leads to increased GDP and growth rates. IMPORT was statistically
significant in three out of the seven regressions. This variable had a negative coefficient which
makes sense because increased spending on imports will not lead decreased per capita growth
rate. The variable for inflation, INFL, was statistically significant at the 5% level in five of the
seven regressions that were conducted. The variables AGEDEP and HUMCAP, representing age
dependency ratio and human capital index respectively, were not statistically significant in any
of the regressions. However, the signs of their coefficients are correct as they will increase per
capita growth rates as they themselves increase.

The variables used to measure the effect of institutions were POLITY, VOACC, POLSTAB,
GOVEFF, REGQUAL, ROL, and CORR. These variables were added to the original model
separately to determine their effect on economic growth. Out of the seven institutional variables
only POLSTAB was statistically significant. REGQUAL and CORR were relatively close to
being significant at the 10% level. The variable representing political stability, POLSTAB, has a
positive coefficient which makes sense as more political stability would lead to a more stable and
confident market. Ultimately this would lead to increased economic growth. The coefficient for
REGQUAL is interesting because it is negative. Conventional thought would lead us to think
better regulation would deliver a more fair and competitive market leading to increased
economic growth. Similarly with the variable CORR, representing control of corruption, the
coefficient was negative. Increased control of corruption should also lead to a more efficient
market. However, this may not be the case in the sample countries due to the culture and
common business practices. It may not be the case around the world, but it would seem that in
BRIC countries it is a necessary evil to have behind the scenes dealings. In some nations around
the world it is simply common practice to use bribery and other corrupt tactics. Although it is not
statistically significant, the sign of the coefficient for GOVEFF would also support this theory.
ROL was also not statistically significant, but the sign of its coefficient supports the findings
from previous research on this topic. ROL, representing rule of law, measures the extent to
which the rules of society are followed. This includes things like private property rights and
upholding the law. Private property rights give consumers incentive to be more productive
because they know they are protected by the law. VOACC, or voice and accountability,
measures a citizens ability to participate in government and freedom to express their opinion on
that government. This variable was negative and not statistically significant. The POLITY

variable similarly measures levels of democracy and autocracy. This variable was also not
statistically significant in determining economic growth as it is illustrated by China who has
experienced substantial economic growth with an autocratic political ideology.
Table 2: Regression Results
I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

-50.0523

-60.784*

-35.71218

-37.04672

-39.25579

-51.74696*

-48.28796*

(34.28218)

(31.06365)

(30.31688)

(35.98034)

(30.47687)

(29.96759)

(29.13507)

-3.73e-12***

-3.49e-12***

-3.75e-12***

-3.45e-12***

-3.56e-12***

-3.76e-12***

-3.82e-12***

(8.85e-13)

(8.40e-13)

(7.72e-13)

(8.28e-13)

(7.81e-13)

(8.40e-13)

(7.96e-13)

83.97731***

76.92254***

70.9835***

77.75424***

71.01399***

81.42945***

76.30557***

(17.03161)

(18.11428)

(16.51284)

(16.53239)

(17.19445)

(15.82807)

(16.08296)

41.90625

41.33942

46.69631*

39.6121

52.52855**

48.20416*

54.478**

(24.91819)

(24.73)

(24.00109)

(24.69057)

(25.30915)

(28.63429)

(26.32341)

-32.38801

-41.69573

-46.72937**

-30.41169

-39.60283*

-28.92283

-47.24626**

(21.82418)

(25.06628)

(21.7515)

(21.39265)

(20.99852)

(23.45486)

(23.28986)

.2482885*

.2823181**

.2383927**

.2988681**

.3000783**

.2679262

.2628637**

(.1273319)

(.122556)

(.1135088)

(.1251104)

(.1173291)

(.1183086)

(.1148491)

.357271

.5600011

.230995

.2640113

.3100063

.3878512

.4158355

AGEDEP

(.4103352)

(.3623677)

(.3045249)

(.3531907)

(.2963152)

(.306498)

(.2859087)

HUMCAP

5.031152

5.537525

1.664496

1.961202

1.548022

5.571606

2.249257

(5.623994)

(5.151239)

(5.475802)

(6.737788)

(5.761081)

(5.161004)

(5.693616)

Constant

GDP

GCF

EXPORT

IMPORT

INFL

POLITY

.0664907
(.2556445)

VOACC

-1.158134
(1.950391)

POLSTAB

1.961355*

(1.159579)
GOVEFF

-3.863116
(4.641011)

REGQUAL

-3.626798
(2.533324)

ROL

2.000103
(4.219343)

CORR

-2.708718
(2.124948)

R2

.7331

.7355

.7551

.7384

.7491

.7345

.7459

Obs.

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Standard error
is in parentheses.
6.0 Conclusion
Over the time period analyzed from 2002-2011 it is evident the BRIC nations have underwent
significant economic growth, some more than others. Like many others worldwide, this study
has attempted to determine what may be the cause of this significant growth. More specifically,
this paper looked at whether institutions played a role in per capita GDP growth rates.
Surprisingly, it was found that institutions played a rather minor role in economic growth in
Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This may have been because this study was limited to the small
10 year time period because of limited data relating to institutions or simply the group of
countries under analysis grew because of different factors.
What this study did find is that political stability is a significant factor for economic growth. A
stable political system provides a foundation for the market and society for which it governs.
With this, an economy has the sense of security and confidence it needs to flourish. Due to these

findings countries around the world should strive to maintain a stable political structure which
will in turn provide the base for which its economy can grow. It is also worth noting that these
countries may operate differently than Western markets. Through regression analysis, it was
found that regulatory quality and control of corruption had negative effects on economic growth.
This would seem counterintuitive because they are such a large part of business practices in
places like the United States and other Western countries. However in the countries analyzed,
things like bribery and backdoor transactions may be part of business. Actions that would be
penalized in the United States might be necessary for the economy to run efficiently in BRIC
nations due to criminal organizations and corrupt government officials. This may lead us to
think that these countries would be better off being left with some corruption if it allows them to
operate more efficiently. In no way does this paper promote illegal business practices.
Regulatory quality, control of corruption, and government effectiveness are what make a market
competitive for all parties and what in theory enables the market to be most efficient.

Appendix A
Variable

Description

Source

Expected
Sign

PCGR

Per capita GDP growth rate based on U.S.
dollar

The World
Bank

GDP

GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross
value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the
products

The World
Bank

+/-

GCF

Gross capital formation consists of outlays on
additions to the fixed assets of the economy
plus net changes in the level of inventories.

The World
Bank

+

EXPORT

Share of merchandise exports at current PPPs.

Penn World
Tables

+

IMPORT

Share of merchandise imports at current PPPs.

Penn World
Tables

-

INFL

Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate
of the GDP implicit deflator.

The World
Bank

+/-

AGEDEP

Age dependency ratio is the ratio of
dependents--people younger than 15 or older
than 64--to the working-age population--those
ages 15-64.

The World
Bank

+

HUMCAP

Index of human capital per person, based on
years of schooling (Barro/Lee, 2012) and
returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994)

Penn World
Tables

+

POLITY

Computes a score between -10 and 10 based on
a country’s characteristics related to democracy
and autocracy.

Polity IV
Project

+

VOACC

Voice and accountability captures the extent to
which a country's citizens are able to participate
in selecting their government, as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators

+

POLSTAB

Political Stability measures the likelihood that
the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence
and terrorism.

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators

+

GOVEFF

Government effectiveness captures the quality
of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, and the quality of policy
formulation and implementation.

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators

+

REGQUAL

Regulatory quality captures the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development.

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators

+

ROL

Rule of law captures the extent to which agents
have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators

+

CORR

Control of corruption captures the degree to
which corruption is perceived to exist among
businesses, public officials and politicians.

Worldwide
Governance
Indicators

+
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GEOGRAPHY

QUICK FACTS
• Population: 174 million
• Top 20 economy by 2050
Currently the largest in Africa
• Democracy
36 states
• OPEC member
13th largest oil producer in the world

RECENT GROWTH
• Africa’s largest economy
Revision to measurement of GDP
Better account of service industry
GDP Doubled to $510 billion
Increased FDI for further growth

RECENT GROWTH (CONT.)
• Poverty
Ranked 121st income per capita; 26th largest
economy
153rd on U.N. Human Development Index
Government Corruption

CORRUPTION
• Possible cause of poverty
Inefficient use of resources and wealth
• President fired head of central bank
Investigation into lost oil revenue

CORRUPTION

OIL THEFT
• Up to $8 billion a year is stolen
• 100,000 barrels a day
• Stolen directly from the pipeline
• Politicians, security forces, militants,
employees, oil traders, and villagers

GOING FORWARD
• Growth will remain strong
Driven by resources, agriculture, trade, and
services
• Inflation will continue to decline
• Must control corruption for better utilization of
production

THE FIRST GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS OF THE 21ST CENTURY
BUT THERE IS ONE ENDURING LESSON OF THE HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL CRISES: THEY ALL END – LAWRENCE SUMMERS

AGENDA
• Review of Sub-Prime Crisis
• Monetary Policy
• Fiscal Policy
• Protectionism
• Other Proposals

SUB-PRIME CRISIS
• Causes:
• Relaxed Lending Standards
• NINJA loans, 100% mortgages, teaser rates, etc.

• Low interest rates increases demand for real estate
• Mortgages securitized to hide risk
• Current account imbalances
• International capital inflows
• Led to intertwining of international markets

THE ASSET BACKED SECURITY (ABS)

MONETARY POLICY
• Common first action was to reduce interest rates
• The Federal Reserve moved aggressively
• European Central Bank (ECB) was reluctant
• Statement by ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet

• Japanese Central Bank already at low interest rates

Interest Rate %

FEDERAL RESERVE INTEREST RATES

Year

Interest Rate %

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INTEREST RATES

Year

Interest Rate %

CHINESE CENTRAL BANK INTEREST RATES

Year

FISCAL POLICY
• IMF recommended a stimulus of 2% of GDP
• United States pushed a $787 billion package
• China passed a 4 trillion yuan package ($586 billion)

• Many in the EU opposed to such high stimulus
• Only the U.S., China, Australia, Spain, and Saudi
Arabia reached the 2% of GDP goal

PROTECTIONISM

PROTECTIONISM
• Protectionism growing trend
• 9% decline in exports
• Anti-dumping claims up 20% in 2008

• Governments adopting new measures to protect
industries
• United States “Buy American” provision
• India banned Chinese toys
• Argentina stricter regulations on textiles and leather goods

• Does protectionism help or hurt?

OTHER PROPOSALS
• IMF strived to play larger role with increased lending
capabilities
– Countries were reluctant to borrow from the IMF

• New world currency proposal from China
– Quickly shot down by the U.S.

GDP
GDP Growth %
China

Germany

Japan

United States

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%

-5.00%

-10.00%

2000

2004

2008

2012

INFLATION RATE
Inflation Rate %
China

Germany

Japan

United States

7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
-1.00%
-2.00%

2000

2004

2008

2012

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Unemployment Rate %
China

Germany

Japan

United States

12.00%

10.00%

8.00%

6.00%

4.00%

2.00%

0.00%

2000

2004

2008

2012

INVESTMENT
Total Investment % of GDP
China

Germany

Japan

United States

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00%

2000

2004

2008

2012

GOVERNMENT DEBT
Government Debt % of GDP
China

Germany

Japan

United States

300.00%

250.00%

200.00%

150.00%

100.00%

50.00%

0.00%

2000

2004

2008

2012

CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Current Account Balance % of GDP
China

Germany

Japan

United States

12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%
-6.00%
-8.00%

2000

2004

2008

2012

CONCLUSION

